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What is the State-of-the-Art on Lucid 
Dreaming?
Recent Advances and Questions for Future Research
Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson
Lucid dreaming may be defined as the conscious awareness that one is dreaming
while dreaming. Instead of incorrectly assuming that one is awake, the dreamer
gains insight about her or his real state of consciousness. Lucid dreaming is rare
and evanescent, which probably accounts for lingering doubts about its veracity
and for its marginalization in science. The purpose of this paper is to review the
evidence that lucid dreaming is a real phenomenon, including evidence for its oc-
currence, underlying mechanisms, and scientific value. Based on admittedly still
limited but fast-growing empirical  evidence,  we will  introduce four hypotheses
centred around lucid dreaming that are deduced from empirical work and that will
hopefully have a bearing on future consciousness research. The Brain Maturation
Hypothesis (1) relates steps in ontogenetic brain development to the frequency of
naturally occurring lucid dreams in children and adults, suggesting that in the im-
mature brain, spontaneous and involuntary lucid dreaming results from accidental
and untypical activation of the frontal cortex during REM sleep. The Hybrid State
Hypothesis (2) and the Space of Consciousness Model (SoC) (3) build on the
electrophysiological peculiarities observed in REM-sleep-induced lucid dreams,
showing a wake-like EEG pattern in frontal parts of the brain and an REM sleep-
like EEG in posterior areas. The Gamma Band Hypothesis (4) proposes that the
same kind of oscillatory activity known to accompany conscious awareness in the
awake brain promotes conscious awareness in REM sleep dreams. Finally, we
present first experimental evidence that lower gamma band activity is indeed a
necessary condition for the elicitation of conscious awareness in dreams. 
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1 Background
Given  its  robust  and  revealing  features,  it  is
surprising  that  dream lucidity  was not  recog-
nized  by  philosophers  of  mind  until  recently
(Metzinger 2003,  1993;  Noreika et  al. 2010;
Revonsuo 2006; Windt in press; Windt & Met-
zinger 2007). Although it was described by Aris-
totle (without using the term, in 350 BC), lucid
dreaming first appears in the experimental liter-
ature  of  the  late  nineteenth  century  (Maury
1861;  Saint-Denis & Marquis 1982). It was de-
scribed  as  a  vehicle  for  self-experimentation
(Arnold-Forster 1921) in the early 20th century
and reported on subjectively (van Eeden 1969).
The modern laboratory study of lucid dreaming
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Figure 1: Lucidity in Dreams (LuCiD) scale (adopted from Voss et al. 2013). 
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was pioneered by  Hearne (1978) and  LaBerge,
beginning in 1980 (1980).
In this paper, we will summarize our five
years  of  scientific  research on lucid dreaming,
provide a systematic overview of our work, and
present new hypotheses about the why (because
of  fluctuations  in  brain  networking)  and  the
how  (through  local  changes  in  lower  gamma
band activity) of lucid dreaming. Regarding the
why,  our  “Brain  Maturation  Hypothesis”  pro-
poses that the probability of lucid dreaming oc-
curring spontaneously is strongly enhanced dur-
ing  the  time  of  cerebral  diversification  and,
most  importantly,  integration  of  the  frontal
lobes  into  the  cortico-cortical  and  cortico-
thalamic networks (Fuster 1989; Goldman-Rakic
1987; Zilles et al. 1988). 
As to the  how of lucid dreaming, we will
outline  our experimental  findings,  focusing on
the increase in lower gamma band activity in
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Figure  2:  (partially adapted from  Voss et al. 2014): Positions on the primary to secondary consciousness axis are
based on the logarithm of ratios of mean scores in lucid and non-lucid dreams. All factors have been identified as com-
ponents of dream consciousness.
a) Rank order of logarithm of mean scores derived from dream reports collected in a home setting. Note that
these reports were often recorded in the morning instead of immediately following an awakening from REM
sleep. Judging from our admittedly limited experience, these reports are less distorted and more story-like than
those following forced awakenings in the laboratory. 
b) Rank order of logarithm of mean scores derived from dream reports following forced awakenings from REM
sleep in a laboratory setting. Lucid dreams, which are thought to add elements of secondary consciousness, are
characterized by increased ratings in reflective INSIGHT, CONTROL over the dream plot, and DISSOCI-
ATION. To a lesser extent, they are accompanied by access to waking MEMORY, as well as NEGATIVE and
POSITIVE EMOTIONS. 
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fronto-temporal brain areas (Gamma Band Hy-
pothesis). We will then move from our first at-
tempts to provide a brain-based explanation of
empirical findings (Hybrid State Hypothesis, see
Hobson &  Voss 2011;  Voss et  al. 2013)  to  a
three-dimensional model of consciousness, allow-
ing for a more structured classification of vari-
ous states of consciousness, ranging from near-
death to highly vigilant wakefulness (“Space of
Consciousness”,  SoC,  compare  Voss &  Voss
2014). 
The presentation of our empirical contri-
butions will begin with a quantitative analysis
of lucid dream subjectivity. This study demon-
strates that the most robust difference between
lucid and non-lucid dreaming is the increase in
insight  into  the  nature  of  one’s  current  con-
scious state that accompanies lucidity. Based on
admittedly few recordings (unpublished) of false
awakenings, we are currently inclined to assume
that there is no notable difference between, for
example, the apparent but non-veridical insight
accompanying a false awakening and actual (lu-
cid) insight into the fact that one is dreaming.
In both falsely and correctly perceived insight
into the current state of arousal, the brain ap-
parently operates in a dissociative mode, allow-
ing for a state-related form of meta-awareness
similar to the awareness of mind-wandering de-
scribed for the wake state (Schooler et al. 2011;
Metzinger 2013). However,  as our experiment-
ally deduced hypotheses are based on those in-
stances in which the dreamer correctly achieved
insight  into  the  fact  that  she  was  dreaming
while the dream continued, we will restrict our
discussion of dream lucidity to these instances.
In discussing these results, we will go so
far as to suggest that lucidity, as the name im-
plies, is insight. We then turn to sleep laborat-
ory  studies  revealing  that  the  principal  brain
correlate of lucid dreaming is 40 Hz activation
of the frontal cortex. When we electrically stim-
ulated the frontal brain via the scalp, we were
able to induce both an increase in 40 Hz brain
activation and the subjective experience of lu-
cidity. In our discussion of these results we sug-
gest  that  the  experimental  study  of  lucid
dreaming  is  a  powerful  paradigm  for  under-
standing the brain basis of conscious experience.
2 Quantification of dream lucidity as 
subjective experience
Perhaps  the  most  problematic  aspect  of  con-
ducting research into lucid dreaming is the diffi-
culty of obtaining both qualified and quantified
evidence  of  the  secondary  consciousness  in
dreams.  By secondary  consciousness  we  mean
the subjective awareness of our state in dream-
ing, and particularly meta-awareness,  meaning
an instance of actively acquired self-knowledge
or a sudden insight, regardless whether it is ac-
curate or counterfactual (see  Metzinger 2013).
Meta-awareness is most clearly manifest in wak-
ing consciousness. Dream consciousness, by con-
trast,  is  called  primary  (following  Edelman
1992) because while it is both richly perceptual
and powerfully emotional, it is weakly cognitive
with  conspicuous  defects  in  insight  (the main
focus of  this  paper)  orientation,  and memory,
though this does not mean that all thinking is
missing (Hobson et al. 2011; Kahan & Sullivan
2012;  Kahn &  Hobson 2005).  See  Hobson &
Voss for detailed discussion of this phenomeno-
logy (2010). 
Regarding  qualification,  Hearne (1978)
and LaBerge (1980, 1985) took advantage of the
fact that humans can be trained to voluntarily
move their eyes in Rapid Eye Movement (REM)
sleep and thereby to signal conscious awareness
while dreaming. Although care must be taken to
minimize  the  rate  of  false  positive  responses,
LaBerge’s  method  has  proven  quite  useful  in
our  own  attempts  to  reliably  identify  lucid
dreaming objectively (Voss et al. 2009).
With  respect  to  quantification,  it  is  im-
portant to note that until recently, lucid dream-
ing was not quantitatively defined. While some
authors  described  lucid  dreams  in  a  narrow
sense as dreams in which one knows that one is
currently dreaming (LaBerge 1985;  LaBerge &
Gackenbach 2000),  others  subscribed  to  a
broader definition of lucidity as an all-pervading
experiential phenomenon, which is purportedly
characterized not only by reflective insight into
the fact that one is currently dreaming, but also
by full intellectual clarity including: the availab-
ility  of  autobiographic  memory  sources,  the
ability to actively control the dream, as well as
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an  overall  increase  in  the  intensity  of  mul-
timodal hallucinatory imagery. This state is of-
ten described as taking on a hyper-real quality
(Tart 1988; Metzinger 2003; Windt & Metzinger
2007). While sharing an interest in the broader
definition, we restrict our attention here to the
narrower one in which insight into the fact that
one  is  currently  dreaming represents  the  core
criterion for lucidity.
In an attempt to be better able to assess
the major and minor determinants of dream lu-
cidity, we developed a Lucidity and Conscious-
ness in Dreams Scale (LuCiD) which was based
on hypotheses derived from theory and which
we analysed and validated using factor-analysis
(Voss et al. 2013). The LuCiD scale presents an
important  step towards shedding light  on the
relationship  between  lucid  dreams  and  other
types of dreaming, as well as on the evaluation
of cognition in the dream state and its relation-
ship to other aspects of dreaming, such as the
intensity  of  hallucinatory  imagery  and  dream
control.
The scale items were constructed by an in-
terdisciplinary team of philosophers, psychiatrists,
and psychologists. Our results are based on re-
ports  of  more  than  300  non-lucid  and  lucid
dreams, and verified by reports following forced
REM sleep  awakenings  in  the  laboratory.  Our
analysis identified eight factors involved in dream
consciousness.  Although it  is  of  course possible
that our initial item pool did not exhaust all the-
oretically possible elements, we consider these res-
ults a first  step in the search for an empirical
definition of  dream consciousness.  According to
the  factor  analysis  that  we  performed,  lucid
dream consciousness can best be described by the
factors (1) INSIGHT into the fact that what one
is currently experiencing is not real, but is only a
dream; (2) a sense of REALISM, pertaining to
the  similarity  between  emotions,  thoughts  and
events with wakefulness as judged after awakening
from the dream; (3) CONTROL over the dream
plot;  (4)  access  to  waking  MEMORY;  (5)
THOUGHT about  other  dream characters;  (6)
POSITIVE EMOTION; (7) NEGATIVE EMO-
TION; and (8) DISSOCIATION akin to taking
on a third-person perspective (for a copy of the
LuCiD scale see Figure 1). 
The factor  analysis  results  support  both
the restricted definition of lucidity that we have
adopted and the broader definition utilised by
others. The strength of the factor INSIGHT fa-
vors the simple definition, while the wide range
of other factors (see Figure  2) favors the more
complex definition. While both types of defini-
tion certainly have their merits, this difficulty in
defining  lucid  dreams  brings  some  important
questions to the fore. What, for instance, is the
exact relationship between metacognitive insight
into the dream state and the hallucinatory qual-
ity of the dream (for the relationship between
thinking  and  hallucinations  across  the  sleep-
wake cycle, see Fosse et al. 2001)? And how do
these aspects of dream lucidity, in turn, influ-
ence the ability to engage in deliberate dream
control, which fluctuates considerably?
3 Lucid vs. non-lucid dreams
3.1 Non-lucid dreams
According  to  our  analysis,  non-lucid  or  “nor-
mal” dreams are characterized by low absolute
values in all factors except REALISM. Non-lu-
cid dreams seem almost to completely lack IN-
SIGHT, CONTROL, and DISSOCIATION. Al-
though mean scores for THOUGHT are higher
than those for MEMORY, both are low if  we
are  considering  absolute  values.  Results  also
show relatively low mean values for NEGATIVE
EMOTION. However, as most of our data were
collected in a laboratory setting, known to in-
crease positive emotionality in  dream imagery
(e.g.,  Hartmann et  al. 2001),  some caution  is
advised regarding the interpretation of  results
with respect to both negative and positive emo-
tion. 
3.2 Lucid dreams
Lucid dreams differ from non-lucid dreams in
six of the eight factors identified in the LuCiD
scale. The leading factor in lucid dreams is IN-
SIGHT. Regarding  the  relevance  of  the  other
factors,  we  observed  different  rank  orders  for
dream reports following sleep in a home setting
(Figure 2a) and those from forced awakenings in
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the laboratory (Figure 2b). The data of our new
laboratory study (Voss et al. 2014) confirm the
findings depicted in Figure  2b, suggesting that
the  leading  factors  in  dream lucidity  are  IN-
SIGHT, CONTROL, and DISSOCIATION. Al-
though, as pointed out by Windt (2013), dream
reports  in  general  must  be  considered  trust-
worthy sources of evidence about subjective ex-
perience during sleep, the degree to which these
reports can be used to draw scientifically sound
conclusions about the dream state strongly de-
pend on the  quality of  the  experimental  pro-
tocol. Such a protocol is more easily established
in a laboratory setting, rendering immediate re-
calls  of  the dream experience,  which must be
considered more reliable with respect to distor-
tions  and  intermixture  with  waking  thought
than those recorded in a home setting (Foulkes
1979; Voss et al.,  unpublished data), although
dreamers might feel  less inclined to report on
sexual  or  aggressive  content.  Furthermore,  re-
ports from home settings usually lack informa-
tion about the particular sleep stage (REM or
NREM) in which the dream evolved. Typically,
NREM dreams are less bizarre and more story-
like (e.g., Dé Waterman & Kenemans 1993). 
With  regard  to  the  distinction  between
primary and secondary consciousness in dreams,
our findings indicate that INSIGHT is a defin-
ing feature of lucidity and that this core aspect
of  secondary  consciousness  is  related  to  the
emergence of  other  features  of  secondary con-
sciousness.  Lucid  dreamers  are  able  to  reflect
not only upon the fact that they are currently
dreaming,  but also  upon the unfolding dream
events.
The  relationship  between  INSIGHT  and
CONTROL  is  clear,  as  realizing  that  one  is
dreaming is an important condition for trying
to control not only one’s own behavior in the
dream, but the dream itself. It must be pointed
out, though, that CONTROL is much more in-
frequent than lucid INSIGHT, and the low cov-
ariance of this factor indicates a strongly lim-
ited variability of scores, suggestive of a floor ef-
fect. In other words, very few participants re-
ported  to  have  experienced  some  (however
small) level of control over the dream plot (see
Voss et al. 2013). Despite this limitation, lucid-
ity appears to be characterized not only by lu-
cid insight. INSIGHT also facilitates the emer-
gence of other aspects of secondary conscious-
ness in dreams such as dissociative thought and
access  to  waking  MEMORY.  Similarly,  while
our  study  found  non-lucid  dreams  to  almost
completely  lack  INSIGHT,  CONTROL,  and
DISSOCIATION. THOUGHT, e.g., about other
dream characters, was not completely absent in
non-lucid dreams (Kahn & Hobson 2003). 
A surprising finding of our study was that
lucid  and  non-lucid  dreams  were  not  distin-
guished by a difference in the sense of REAL-
ISM. Whereas we previously thought that lucid-
ity was characterized by a lack of  bizarreness
(see  Voss et al. 2013), further exploration sug-
gests that this factor is associated with the de-
gree  to  which  the  dream  feels  real.  Lucid
dreams feel as subjectively realistic as non-lucid
dreams. This finding was fully replicated in our
most recent study (Voss et al. 2014). A question
we are currently not able to answer is whether
both dream types are equally bizarre (see also
Windt 2013). 
Our finding of realistic conviction stands
in apparent contrast to reports from other au-
thors who found that the onset of lucidity is of-
ten accompanied by a change in the overall ex-
periential quality of the dream, noting that lu-
cid dreams are often described as taking on a
surreal,  dream-like  quality  (cf.  LaBerge 1985;
Brooks &  Vogelsong 2000;  Tholey &  Utecht
2000). At present, we are inclined to think that
perhaps  the  different  perceptions  may  be  re-
lated to the already-mentioned confounding of
wake-  and sleep-induced lucid experiences.  To
our  knowledge,  lucid  dreams  entered  through
the  wake  state  (e.g.,  Wake-Induced  Lucid
Dreaming,  WILD,  see  Stumbrys et  al. 2012)
and those arising out of  REM sleep have not
been  systematically  compared  with  regard  to
phenomenology  or  Electroencephalography
(EEG). Nonetheless, we think it plausible to as-
sume that  the WILD technique  will  result  in
more wake-like experiences, simply because they
arise  out  of  the  wake  state  or  the  transition
from waking to sleep, usually at the beginning
of the night or after morning awakenings. A re-
turn to the wake state is in most cases easily ac-
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complished. By contrast, dreamers who achieve
lucidity out of REM sleep remain in REM sleep,
not always being able  to wake up voluntarily
(Voss et al. 2009, 2014; Voss & Voss 2014). Re-
garding REALISM, lucid dreams arising out of
REM sleep are apparently not accompanied by
a change in the subjectively experienced realism
of the dream. 
3.3 Natural frequency of lucid dreams: 
The brain maturation hypothesis (1)
REM-sleep-induced  lucid  dreaming  is  unique
because  it  represents  an  exceptional  state  in
which the brain is  in two states  at  the same
time: awake and asleep. However,  while many
have experienced the phenomenon, few experi-
ence it on a regular basis. Why? So far, predis-
posing  psychological  variables  have  not  been
clearly identified (Schredl & Erlacher 2004). We
have  long  speculated  (Hobson 2009),  and
Schredl & Erlacher (2011) have confirmed, that
lucid dreaming is negatively correlated with age.
Why? And when does lucid dreaming actually
set in? These questions need to be addressed in
order  to  provide  at  least  some clues  about a
very  important  question:  Why  does  lucid
dreaming occur at all? 
To investigate the natural frequency of lu-
cid dreaming in children and young adults, we
interviewed almost 800 students aged 6–19. Stu-
dents were recruited from local schools in and
around Bonn, Germany, thanks to the enthusi-
astic cooperation of teachers and parents. Each
student  was  interviewed  alone,  during  school
hours, and asked to provide a dream report and
to answer questions about dreaming, lucid and
non-lucid. In addition, to account for social de-
sirability, students were tested for suggestibility
(see Voss et al. 2013), which led to the exclusion
of almost 100 data sets. 
The main  findings  of  our survey were  a
surprisingly high incidence of reported lucidity
in  the  young  and  more  frequent  lucidity  in
those  who  are  intellectually  more  capable.  In
total, 52% of participating students reported to
have recalled at least one lucid episode in their
life. The highest incidence rate of recent lucid
dreams was observed in the young. Frequency
rates seem to remain at steady levels until age
16, after which they drop dramatically. 
In  our  study,  only  one  third  of  lucid
dreamers  claimed  to  be  able  to  change  the
dream plot,  showing  that  plot  control  is  not
automatically activated in lucid dreaming. As in
previous reports (e.g., Wolpin et al. 1992), plot
control  was  significantly  associated  with  fre-
quency of lucid dreaming, suggesting that it is
susceptible  to  training.  Plot  control  was  also
found to vary with age. It remained at relatively
high rates (up to 50% of lucid dreams) from 6
to 14 years and started to decrease from that
age on. Lucid dreaming incidence or frequency
was not related to sleep duration or napping. 
Based  on  previous  research  into  lucid
dreaming, we are inclined to interpret these res-
ults as evidence that lucid dreaming is an ex-
ceptional  mental  state  occurring  naturally  in
the course of brain maturation. It is noteworthy
that the peak in spontaneous occurrence of lu-
cid dreaming coincides with the final stages of
frontal lobe myelination and a time of synapse
expansion and dendritic growth. These neurobi-
ological  changes  provide  the  prerequisites  for
the integration of the frontal lobes (which are
REM sleep-atypically activated in lucid dream-
ing)  into  the  cortico-cortical  and  cortico-
thalamic networks (Fuster 1989; Goldman-Rakic
1987; Zilles et al. 1988).
Lucid dreaming may thus occur naturally
during the final stages of frontal lobe integra-
tion, a process similar to an upgrade of com-
puter hardware. It seems to us most likely that
the peak in spontaneous dream lucidity in child-
hood and puberty (Stumbrys et al. 2014;  Voss
et al. 2013) is nothing but an accidental con-
founding of  conscious states  during a time of
high cerebral  diversification.  In an adult,  ma-
ture brain system, relatively firm covariates for
states of arousal have been established, For ex-
ample, the frontal lobe activity during waking is
usually enhanced, whereas it is down-regulated
during REM sleep. Our Brain Maturation Hy-
pothesis speculates that during childhood and
puberty, frontal lobe activity is sometimes de-
coupled from the arousal state so that frontal
lobes  can become active  in  a state for  which
this type of activity is untypical. An intriguing
Voss, U. & Hobson, A. (2015). What is the State-of-the-Art on Lucid Dreaming? - Recent Advances and Questions for Future Research.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 38(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570306 7 | 20
www.open-mind.net
finding is that not only lucid insight but also
dissociative  phenomena  like  derealization  and
depersonalization can easily be trained in  the
laboratory during this same period in ontogen-
etic development (Leonard et al. 1999). DISSO-
CIATION  is  a  key  factor  that  discriminates
between lucid and non-lucid dreams (Figure  2,
see also van Eeden 1969; Voss et al. 2013, 2014).
In lucid dreams, dissociation is often described
as taking on a visual third-person perspective,
documenting  a  split  between  dreamer  and
dream observer (Gabel 1989; Rossi 1972) (“I see
myself  from  the  outside”),  whereas  non-lucid
dreams are typically experienced from the first-
person perspective, at least in adults (Foulkes et
al. 1990; Gackenbach 2009; Snyder 1970; Voss et
al. 2013). At this point, it may be important to
note that we do not categorically differentiate
between  observer  dreams  and  lucid  dreams.
Based  on  the  results  from  our  LuCiD  scale
study and in agreement with Gabel (1989), who
speaks of “reflections of a dissociated self-monit-
oring system” (p. 560), we make a quantitative
distinction between dreams experienced as first-
or third-person, since DISSOCIATION is, next
to INSIGHT and plot CONTROL, a key factor
that discriminates lucid from non-lucid dreams
(see Figure 2). 
The  fact  that  lucid  dreaming  is  more
readily experienced by those who are more ad-
vanced in abstract thinking and charged with
reflective insight implies that lucid dreaming
is indeed related to brain maturation. Support
for this interpretation comes from a study by
Lapina et  al. (1998).  Although  details  of
method  and  sample  characteristics  have  not
been  reported,  the  authors  claim  a  higher
level of lucidity in advanced learners. If this is
true, however, then why does lucid dreaming
decrease in early adulthood, considering that,
surely,  older students have acquired a higher
level  of  abstraction  than  younger  ones?  At
this point, we can only speculate about pos-
sible  and  probable  causes.  One  explanation
that should be further investigated is that lu-
cid dreaming occurs naturally in the immature
but developing brain. 
Lucidity could thus be a transient dissoci-
ative state during brain maturation that is nor-
mally  lost  in  adulthood  but  still  accessible
through training.
3.4 The hybrid state hypothesis (2) of 
lucid dreaming
The quantification  of  subjective  experience  in
dream lucidity led us to assume that when the
brain-mind  shifts  from  non-lucid  to  lucid
dreaming, it becomes a hybrid state with ele-
ments of both waking and dream consciousness.
In  lucid  dreaming,  thinking  is  only  partially
ruled by primary consciousness. To some extent,
the  dreamer  has—however  limited—access  to
secondary consciousness, enabling her to reflect
on her present state. Aside from knowing that
the on-going dream is not real, the dream is of-
ten experienced as if it were seen from the out-
side, almost as if the dream were an on-going
theatrical production or motion picture (Voss et
al. 2014).1 In other words, lucid dreams can be
considered dissociated states of consciousness in
which the dream self separates from the on-go-
ing flow of mental imagery. The dream is still a
dream, but the dreamer is able to distance him
or herself from the on-going imagery and may
even be successful in gaining (at least partial)
control over the dream plot. This phenomenolo-
gical dissociation is physiologically accompanied
by  highly  selective  increases  in  gamma  band
activity around 40 Hz in fronto-temporal areas
of  the  brain  (Dresler et  al. 2012;  Voss et  al.
2009,  2014),  while occipito-parietal regions re-
tain  a  typical  REM-sleep  profile.  For  lucid
dreams arising out of REM sleep, we have been
able  to  document  the  maintenance  of  sleep
throughout the lucid dream, suggesting that lu-
cid dreaming alters REM sleep without surpass-
ing it:  REM sleep atonia is  unchanged,  rapid
eye  movement  bursts  (REMs)  continue  as  in
REM sleep. However, the EEG frequency spec-
1 We  realize  that  focusing  on  DISSOCIATION  appears  to  neglect
other important aspects of lucid dreaming like agency and knowledge
about the ability to exert control, which often seem to occur simul-
taneously. As a matter of fact, we have observed a significant effect
on control, however, during stimulation with 25 Hz but not with 40
Hz, suggesting that oscillatory activity is indeed related to specific
brain function. As this is an intriguing but also surprising finding, it
is in need of thorough further testing. Please keep in mind that the
study of lucid dreaming is still in its fledgling stages and that we
have only just begun to explore its possibilities. 
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trum is significantly altered (Voss et al. 2009).
Normally, REM sleep dreams are accompanied
by strongly attenuated activation and synchron-
icity in the gamma frequency band (Castro et
al. 2013;  Gandal et al. 2012;  Voss et al. 2009),
especially in frontal parts of the brain (Castro
et al. 2013;  Voss et al. 2009) suggestive of re-
duced  conscious  awareness  and  executive  ego
functions (Desmedt & Tomberg 1994). By con-
trast, gamma band activity in lucid dreaming is
significantly increased, while all lower frequen-
cies  remain  unchanged.  This  finding  strongly
suggests that sleep and even REM sleep is in-
deed maintained. Based on reports of our sub-
jects on their lucid experiences we must assume,
however,  that  lucid  dreams  push  the  arousal
system towards waking while remaining within
the region occupied by REM sleep and thus rep-
resenting a substate located at the inner bound-
aries of the REM sleep area within the SoC. Lu-
cid dreaming is, thus, a fragile, destabilized hy-
brid  state.  Several  participants in  our studies
have stated that it takes effort to dream lucidly
and that such dreams are easily interrupted by
noise or state of mind. 
Report of a lucid dreamer, f, 30 years old:
“To me, being lucid is always a very exciting in-
cident […] In this state it feels like a struggle in
my  brain  between  keeping  the  dream-scenery
and waking. In these short periods of lucidity
the awareness of the acting dream body and the
real  body  in  bed  exist  simultaneously  and  it
costs a lot of concentration to keep the balance
between both” (for further examples, see Voss &
Voss 2014).
We also suggest that lucid dreaming is not
just a hybrid state but actually the realization
of two normally distinct global  functions that
usually don’t occur simultaneously. This fits in
well  with  the  common  description  of  lucid
dreams  as  (partial)  awakening  in  our  dreams
and  involving  a  split  between  dreamer  and
dream-observer, who coexist and change relative
dominance of the mind at will (Occhionero et
al. 2005). The implications of this line of reas-
oning have profound impact on the theory of
mind. There are two selves, suggesting that the
self is a construct elaborated by the brain (Met-
zinger 2003, 2009, 2013). The two selves of the
lucid dreamer are mediated by distinct brain re-
gions: dreaming is ponto-occipital while lucidity
is fronto-cortical. Normally these two brain re-
gions play a winner-takes-all game and dream-
ing is  non-lucid.  We come back to this  point
when we present our physiological model below.
We are attracted by the idea that a key
cognitive component of waking, namely insight,
can be admixed or even actively injected into
REM sleep.  Determining  the  degree  to  which
this enhancement of lucidity is voluntary neces-
sitates a better understanding of altered states
of waking conscious awareness, such as hypnosis
or  mind  wandering.  We  need  to  know  more
about conscious state control and to bring that
understanding  into  conjunction  with  our  at-
tempt  to  understand and influence  conscious-
ness. 
3.5 Space of Consciousness Model (3)
To speak of  lucid dreaming as a hybrid state
implies,  of  course,  that states in general  have
boundaries  and  intermediates  (so-called  hy-
brids). We have, in a recent publication (Voss &
Voss 2014) taken this thought further and pro-
posed a model  based on the assumption that
consciousness is a dynamical process unfolding
in  a  phenomenal  state-space  continuum occu-
pied by states of arousal such as waking, sleep,
and coma. Normally, waking and dreaming con-
stitute  two  distinct  partitions  in  this  state-
space. In our new model, what we have called
the hybrid of lucid dreaming is depicted as a re-
gion  within  the  state  of  REM  sleep  that
stretches REM state variability to the point of
destabilizing  it,  bordering  on  waking  without
inducing a complete change of the global config-
uration. 
In our SoC model, we define consciousness
as a three-dimensional space occupied by states
that vary as a function of sensing, judging, and
motor control. “Sensing” refers to the ability to
experience  physical  and  mental  fluctuations.
“Judging” is meant to describe varying degrees
of higher-order cognitive capacities such as re-
flective awareness, including the ability to disso-
ciate, to think about the past and contemplate
the future, and make decisions. The “motor con-
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trol” dimension was introduced to allow enough
space to position different types of unresponsive
states such as coma (low motor control, low sens-
ing, and low judging) and, for example, locked-in-
syndrome, which would be low in motor control
but  high  in  sensing  and  high  in  judging.  Our
model is even broad enough to include artificial
intelligence (e.g., high judging and low sensing)
and to span all forms of animal life as well (see
Tononi 2004). Importantly, we do not differenti-
ate between internal and external sources of in-
formation or state-dependent neurochemical mod-
ulations, as laid out in the AIM model (Hobson
et al. 2000; for an early version see  Hobson &
McCarley 1977). Our space-state model is exclus-
ively phenomenological. The main questions it ad-
dresses  center  around  state  boundaries  and
within-state variability. 
The  space is divided into subspaces, cor-
responding to states of arousal, such as waking,
sleep, or coma. These  States largely determine
the ability to interact with the external world.
We may think of this total space as originating
at the near-death state,  spanning over several
stages  of  sleep  and  wakefulness  to  some ulti-
mate wake-state of focused attention (see Figure
3). However, it should be kept in mind that the
near-death state may not at all be one of min-
imal  expressions  of  judging  and/or  sensing
(Borjigin et al. 2013;  Nelson 2014) so that an-
other altered state may more accurately define
the true origin of the SoC.
Lucid dreaming briefly creates a trajectory
that dynamically integrates the region normally
occupied  by  waking  experiences  with  that  of
dreaming. 
Each  state,  occupying  some  area  within
the SoC, can also be described by a finite num-
ber of attributes, and each state possesses a lim-
ited degree of variability. Within the partition
characterizing wakefulness, for example, we find
mind wandering,  meditation, and hypnosis,  as
well  as  focused  attention.  Regarding  lucid
dreams,  we  assume  that  wake-induced  lucid
dreams can be represented by trajectories lead-
ing the system very close to the borders, but
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Figure 3: 3-dimensional Space of Consciousness Model (adapted from Voss & Voss 2014, p. 32).
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which still remain within the overall region in-
habited by wake states, whereas REM-sleep-in-
duced lucid dreams initially belong to the sleep
state and then evolve towards a brief and un-
stable integration of the phenomenological sub-
states of waking and dreaming. 
Some  new  questions  that  derive  directly
from the model concern (1) the exact number of
separable states; (2) specification of the sufficient
and causally enabling (perhaps even necessary)
conditions allowing for transition from one state
into another; and (3) the volume and the dimen-
sionality (the “depth”) of a given region in state-
space characterizing each individual state, some
perhaps extending over such a broad spectrum of
conscious  experiences  that  substates  can  be
defined within the total of SoC and some occupy-
ing only a diminutive space such as coma. An ex-
ample  of  a  high-volume  region  in  phenomenal
state-space is wakefulness, covering a wide range
of substates including WILD, mind-wandering, fo-
cused attention, and hyper-arousal. Another re-
gion is sleep, providing a smaller and more di-
mensionally limited, but nonetheless also consid-
erable range of substates such as light sleep, slow
wave sleep, REM sleep (both phasic and tonic),
and lucid dreaming.
The SoC model is only an approximation,
but we hope that it will prove useful in the gener-
ation and testing of specific hypotheses. With re-
gard to lucid dreaming, we hope that this model
will contribute to understanding and categorizing
the many different aspects and conditions of in-
sightful dreams such as those arising out of the
wake state (WILD) versus those arising out of
REM sleep. We would expect wake-induced lucid
dreams to be accompanied by a much greater mo-
tor  control,  for  example,  than  lucid  dreams
arising out of REM sleep, simply because WILD
are located near the borders of the wake state
whereas REM lucid dreams occur in sleep. 
3.6 EEG changes associated with lucid 
dreaming
Our  first  quantitative  EEG  study  on  lucid
dreaming  aimed  to  identify  changes  in  brain
activity, provided they turned out to be measur-
able. For this purpose, we trained a relatively
large group of students (N = 20) at Bonn Uni-
versity  in  lucid  dreaming.  Following  several
months of preparation, we took those who had
achieved lucidity at home 2–3 times per week
into  the  sleep  laboratory  at  the  Neurological
Clinic of Frankfurt University Hospital.
Although our subjects were highly motiv-
ated, our hopes of being able to trace a multi-
tude of lucid dreams soon had to be abandoned,
since  our  enduring  attempts  yielded  EEG re-
cordings  of  only  three  spontaneous  lucid
dreams! Results of this meagre yield were pub-
lished  (Voss et  al. 2009),  showing  that  lucid
dreaming  occurs  when  activity  in  the  lower
gamma band around 40 Hz increases, particu-
larly  in  frontal  parts  of  the  brain.  In  other
words, the results suggested that normal dream-
ing  is  cognitively  impaired  because  of  frontal
lobe deactivation and lucidity only occurs when
that deactivation is suspended, either spontan-
eously or by design. 
This finding is depicted in Figure 4, show-
ing single subject 40 Hz EEG power (36–44 Hz)
during  waking  with  eyes  closed  (top),  lucid
dreaming (middle), and normal non-lucid REM
sleep (bottom). 
Another finding concerns EEG coherence,
or synchronicity (see Figure 5). Whereas the co-
herence between different brain areas is high in
waking (top), it is very low in non-lucid REM
sleep (bottom). In lucid dreaming, however, it is
significantly increased in comparison to non-lu-
cid  dreaming,  especially  between anterior  and
posterior parts of the brain (middle).
In this first study, we encountered several
methodological difficulties. 
1. For  the  subjects,  achieving  lucidity  in  a
laboratory setting was difficult. In all three
instances, lucid dreaming occurred in the late
morning hours, i.e., after 8am. Our study was
conducted  in  the  sleep  laboratory  of  the
Neurological Clinic at the Frankfurt Univer-
sity  Hospital.  This  implied  a  noisy  early
morning routine in which patients were fre-
quently  moved  for  examination  purposes,
breakfast was served, and floors were cleaned
with heavy machinery. It is our opinion now
that lucid dreaming arising out of REM sleep
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is a fragile state that can be easily disrupted
by ambient noise.
2. Several authors have cautioned that some of
the  variance  in  gamma  activity  might  be
caused  by  microsaccadic  eye  movements
(Trujillo et al. 2005;  Yuval-Greenberg et al.
2008;  Weinstein et  al. 1991)  and  by  scalp
EMG  activity  (Whitham et  al. 2008;
Whitham et  al. 2007).  Although  it  is  not
known, at this point, whether microsaccades
are present in steady-states, especially sleep,
we have, for publication purposes, conducted
a very conservative signal analysis using cur-
rent source densities (Current Source Densit-
ies,  CSD).  By using  this  method,  we  may
have overcorrected our EEG scalp potentials,
which means that the actual increase in lower
gamma  band  activity  is  probably  even
greater than reported. 
3. Our subjects reported themselves to be less
lucid in the laboratory than at home. When
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Figure 4: (adapted from Voss  et al. 2009). Single sub-
ject 40-Hz standardized CSD power during  Waking with
Eyes  Closed (WEC) (top), lucid dreaming (middle), and
REM sleep  (bottom).  Topographic  images  are  based  on
movement-free EEG episodes and are corrected for ocular
artifacts. 
Figure 5: State-dependent short and long range coherences
in  the  40 Hz frequency  band during Waking with  Eyes
Closed (WEC) (top), lucid dreaming (middle), and non-lu-
cid REM sleep dreaming (bottom). Coherences are indica-
tions of interscalp networking and synchronization. Short-
range (N = 55 pairs) was defined as less than 10cm and
long-range (65 pairs) as larger than 15cm inter-electrode dis-
tance. Coherences are lowest in REM sleep and strongly en-
hanced in lucid dreaming.
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asked  to  specify  this  subjective  rating,  we
found that the subjects’ responses were vague
and  mostly  concerned  with  the  amount  of
plot control achieved in the dream. 
The  findings  of  our  2009  study  indicate
that  when  subjects  became  lucid,  they  shift
their EEG power, especially in the 40Hz range
and especially in  frontal regions of  the brain.
This shift is, in part, a consequence of pre-sleep
auto-suggestion,  indicating  that  REM  dream
consciousness,  which is largely automatic (i.e.,
spontaneous, involuntary, and intrinsic), is par-
tially subject to volitional force. This observa-
tion and its interpretation have an obvious rela-
tionship to the question of free will, an implica-
tion we will discuss later. Our speculative hypo-
thesis is that dream lucidity arises when wake-
like  frontal  lobe  activation  is  associated  with
REM-like activity in posterior structures.
3.7 The gamma band hypothesis (4)
In our study of EEG tracings during lucid dream-
ing, the most striking finding was that lucidity
was accompanied by an increased activation of
the frontal lobes of the brain. This applies both to
synchronicity  and  to  consciousness-related  fre-
quencies (around 40 Hz). This observation has led
us to propose a “gamma band hypothesis” (Voss
et al. 2012; Hobson & Voss 2011), suggesting that
brain activation in the 40 Hz frequency range is
related to secondary consciousness. We have, in a
recent study (Voss et al. 2014), investigated this
hypothesis by fronto-temporal application of weak
electrical  currents  in  various  frequencies.  The
study was aimed at testing for causality. If activ-
ity centered around 40 Hz was causally related to
secondary  consciousness  as  expressed  in  lucid
dreaming, then the application of 40 Hz should
induce lucid dreaming, provided that it is possible
to change brain function in a frequency-specific
way through mild electrical stimulation. 
3.8 Induction of lucidity via electrical 
stimulation 
In our latest study, we set out to test the hy-
pothesis  that  lower  gamma  activity  in  the
frontal and temporal parts of the brain caus-
ally  enables  lucidity  during  dreaming.  If  the
observed gamma activity during naturally-oc-
curring lucid dreaming plays a causal role in
lucidity, we predicted that facilitation of that
frequency  band  with  40  Hz  transcranial  al-
ternating  current  stimulation  (tACS)  over
fronto-temporal  areas  would  increase  the
probability  of  lucid  dreaming.  On  the  other
hand, tACS with a lower or higher frequency
should have no effect  or even suppress  lucid
dreaming. The current strength was kept be-
low arousal threshold (250 µA) in order not to
awaken the  subjects.  Participants  were  inex-
perienced lucid dreamers without psychopath-
ology or sleep problems. They were not asked
to  try  to  have  a  lucid  dream.  Instead,  they
were told that the study goal was to investig-
ate the effects of mild electrical stimulation in
different  frequencies  on  dream  content  and
sleep  parameters.  While  we  were  doubtful
whether it was at all possible to enforce a spe-
cific  rhythm on  the  brain  (“driving  fields”),
results  suggest  that  it  is  indeed  possible  to
change brain activation in a frequency-specific
way (see Figure 6). However, we only observed
such an effect for frequencies within the lower
gamma  frequency  band.  Stimulation  with
higher or lower frequencies did not result in a
measurable change in the respective frequency
band, i.e., stimulation with 2 Hz did not lead
to an increase in delta frequency band power. 
Regarding lower gamma band stimulation,
the induced change in lower gamma band brain
activity was obviously  potent  enough to alter
conscious awareness in the dream with increased
LuCiD ratings especially for INSIGHT and DIS-
SOCIATION. Again, this was not observed fol-
lowing stimulation with either higher or lower
frequencies.
In this experiment, we tested twenty-seven
healthy subjects, during up to four non-consec-
utive nights. Testing was conducted in a neuro-
physiologic sleep laboratory at Goettingen Uni-
versity Hospital. We tested during the summer
break of the laboratory and on weekends, which
provided a quiet environment and which allowed
subjects to continue sleep beyond normal hos-
pital wake-up hours. Participants were allowed
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to sleep uninterrupted during the first  half  of
the night until at least 3am. 
Starting  at  3am,  stimulation  (30s  long)
was conducted  during REM phases,  and sub-
jects were awakened shortly after this stimula-
tion. At this time, they were asked to provide a
dream report and ratings to all items of the Lu-
CiD  scale.  The  study  was  performed  double
blind, so that neither the subject nor the inter-
viewer knew the stimulation frequency applied.
In a repeated measures design, all participants
were exposed to all stimulation conditions, i.e.,
sham (no current applied), 2 Hz, 6 Hz, 12 Hz,
25 Hz,  40 Hz, 70 Hz, and 100 Hz (details  of
methods, see Voss et al. 2014).
Note that we only applied tACS during
REM phases,  as  lucid  dreams  arising  out  of
REM sleep  were  our  main  research  interest.
Repetitive  stimulation  during  other  sleep
stages would have exhausted the experimental
protocol  and  would  have  led  to  many  un-
desired  side  effects  such  as  sleep-deprivation
from repetitive  early  awakenings,  changes  in
sleep  architecture,  carry-over  effects  from
stimulation in other sleep stages, time-of-night
effects, etc.
As shown in Figure 6, only stimulation in
the lower gamma band, i.e., stimulation with 25
and 40 Hz, led to an increase in activity in this
particular frequency band. 
At  present,  we  can  only  speculate  why
the other frequencies were not as easily adop-
ted by the brain. Lower frequencies might not
have been readily entrained because of state-
dependency,  as  proposed  by  several  authors
(Buzsáki &  Draguhn 2004;  Vyazovskiy et al.
2009;  Tononi et al. 2010;  Brown et al. 2012;
Suh et al. 2010). It is possible that if we had
tried to induce a frequency typically enhanced
in slow wave sleep (SWS), for example, such
stimulation might have disturbed physiological
sleep-dependent oscillations, which would pre-
vent the brain from accepting such a driving
field. This notion is supported by direct cur-
rent (DC) studies (equivalent of 0 Hz) of brain
stimulation  in  REM  sleep  (Jakobson et  al.
2012a;  Stumbrys et al. 2013).  Both group of
researchers were unable to alter on-going men-
tal activity at 0 Hz, just as we were unable to
induce lucidity at 2, 6, or 12 Hz. Interestingly,
dream reports were less frequent in these stim-
ulation conditions (Voss et al. 2014). However,
this  does  not  explain  why  stimulation  with
higher frequencies, i.e., 70 and 100 Hz, did not
lead to an increase in these frequency bands.
It also does not explain why a DC stimulation
during stage 2 sleep reportedly effected an in-
crease  in  visual  dream  reports  although,  in
this case, the effect was apparently small and,
according  to  the  authors,  possibly  due  to
arousals  and  short  awakenings  (Jakobson et
al. 2012b).  At  this  point,  we  speculate  that
lower gamma band frequencies lead to a vis-
ible effect because they are linked to the un-
folding of secondary consciousness in dreams. 
The most  striking  finding was that  sub-
jects  reported the  ability  to “see  myself  from
the outside” and to “watch the dream from the
outside  as  if  it  was  displayed  on  a  screen”.
These  items  belong  to  the  factor  DISSOCI-
ATION.  Apparently,  our  subjects  took  on  a
third-person perspective following lower gamma
band  stimulation  but  not  stimulation  in  any
other frequency (2 Hz, 6 Hz, 12 Hz, 70 Hz, 100
Hz) or sham (no current applied). 
However, although we were able to induce
secondary  consciousness  in  dreams  through
stimulation with 40 Hz, a similar though smal-
ler effect was observed for stimulation with 25
Hz. Surprisingly, 25 Hz stimulation was associ-
ated  with  CONTROL  over  the  dream  plot,
whereas stimulation with 40 Hz was not. This
finding  suggests  that  specific  brain  rhythms
may  be  directly  linked  to  cognitive  functions
and that we have just begun to discover their
potential. 
Surprisingly,  we  found  no  evidence  of
theta-gamma coupling, as would be expected
from  NREM  sleep  studies  (Marshall et  al.
2011).  At present,  we think this  may be  re-
lated to the fact that NREM sleep is highly
synchronized,  perhaps  facilitating  such coup-
ling, whereas NREM sleep is desynchronized.
As is often the case in science, answering one
question generates several others. We will con-
tinue to search for answers and also look for-
ward to the extension of our studies by other
laboratories.
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Figure 6: Effect of transcranial alternating current stim-
ulation (tACS) on EEG gamma power. tACS electrodes
were placed bilaterally at frontal and temporal positions
(black  rectangles)  and  current  flowed  back  and  forth
between these electrodes. EEG electrode placements are
indicated as dark dots.
a) Stimulation with 6 Hz resulted in no change in lower
gamma activity around 40 Hz (37–43 Hz).
b) Stimulation with 40 Hz led to a strong increase in
lower gamma activity around 40 Hz. 
c) Grand average Fast Fourier Transform (Fast Fourier
Transform, FFT) power ratios of activity during vs.
activity prior to stimulation for the 6 Hz stimulation
condition.  Yellow shading represents  mean values  2
standard errors (s.e.). Any excursions outside of this
range would be considered significant at least at the p
< .05 level. However, with 6 Hz, we see no significant
stimulation-induced increase in 6 Hz activity.
d) Grand average FFT power ratios of activity during vs.
activity prior to stimulation for the 40 Hz stimulation
condition.  Yellow shading represents  mean values  2
standard  errors  (s.e.).  Note  that  lucid dreams (red
line) are accompanied by a significantly larger increase
in the 40 Hz frequency band than non-lucid dreams
(blue line) (independent two-sided t tests between lu-
cid  and  non-lucid  dreams  during  stimulation  with
40 Hz: t40Hz = 5.01, df = 35, p < 0.001).
3.9 Brain Correlates of Lucidity and a 
Neuropsychological Model.
Our findings of frontal cortical EEG activation
to  a  level  intermediate  between  non-lucid
dreaming and waking is compatible with the hy-
brid state formulation derived from subjective
data.  More specifically,  we attribute the find-
ings  to  sufficient  activation  of  executive  ego
functions in the frontal lobes (Baddeley 1992;
Goleman & Davidson 1979), but not so intense
an  activation  as  to  disenable  the  REM sleep
generator in the pons and posterior thalamocor-
tical  brain  that  is  the  physical  substrate  of
dreaming. This formulation is resonant with the
oft-repeated  complaint  that  dream  lucidity  is
difficult both to attain and maintain. The hy-
brid state of waking and dreaming is thus both
rare and fragile, suggesting that it is not an ad-
aptive condition for survival and has been elim-
inated, or reduced to a very low level, by evolu-
tion.
It is not difficult to imagine why it would
be maladaptive to program waking and dream
consciousness at the same time. We will come
back to this consideration when we discuss clin-
ical  implications  below,  but  at  this  point  we
wish to stress the winner-takes-all  model that
we have sketched as the protoconsciousness hy-
pothesis  (Hobson 2009).  According  to  that
model, both waking and dreaming are states of
consciousness  engendered  by  specifiable  brain
mechanisms. Waking is governed by aminergic
dominance, and dreaming by cholinergic domin-
ance,  but  both  states  depend  on  suppression
but not total obliteration of the other. Waking
and dreaming are competitive and cooperative
brain-mind states. 
Of  course  there  is  more  to  the  neuro-
physiology of the differential brain mediation of
waking and dreaming. In addition to the chem-
ical  neuromodulation  mentioned  above,  we
know that REM sleep dreaming is mediated by
the active inhibition of both sensory and motor
input and output. The data from our studies of
lucidity now further suggest that the two states
are also differentiated by regional activation of
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the cortex. Waking and lucid dreaming are both
favored by strong 40 Hz power in the frontal
EEG, indicating that frontal lobe activation is a
critical  mediator  of  both  waking  and  lucid
dream consciousness. Because this sort of activ-
ation has been found to correlate with lucidity,
we hypothesize that it mediates the wake state
component of lucidity. This supposition is also
supported by the finding of frontal lobe inactiv-
ation in  REM sleep,  which is  correlated with
non-lucid dreaming (Braun et al. 1997; Dang-Vu
et al. 2007;  Desseilles et al. 2011;  Nofzinger et
al. 1997).
An additional nicety of the theory is that
the  voluntary  eye  movements  by  which  lucid
dreamers indicate their awareness of their con-
scious  state  to  third-party  observers  (Hearne
1978;  LaBerge 1980) is evidence of frontal eye
field  activation  in  lucid  dreamers.  This  voli-
tional override of  the brain stem saccadic eye
movement generator is further evidence of the
change in the balance of brain-power in several
states of consciousness. In lucid dreaming, the
wake state control of gaze is returned via frontal
lobe activation. According to Metzinger (2013),
this is tantamount to the activation of an “epi-
stemic agent model” (EAM), a representation of
the self as knowing. This would seem to clinch
the argument that conscious states are electro-
physiologically differentiated and explained by
neurophysiology. This is not surprising, but its
specification has been greatly advanced by the
scientific  investigation  of  lucid  dreaming.  A
speculative hypothesis that we believe must be
tested  is  that  waking  entails  not  only  frontal
lobe dominance in mediating thought and top-
down eye movement control, but that the brain
stem itself is primarily harnessed to the analysis
of external data with relative suppression of its
internal  program  (see  also  Activation-Input
Gating-Modulation, AIM model, Hobson 1992). 
Unfortunately  we  have  no  animal  model
for dream lucidity because we have every reason
to suppose  that  reflective  insight  such as  ob-
served in lucid dreaming necessitates sufficient
language  capacities  assumed  essential  in  the
formation of  abstract  thought (Einstein 1941)
or reporting of such. For this reason, we assume
that infra-human mammals, which lack signific-
ant language capability, cannot become lucid or
report their  non-verbal dreams. Whatever one
thinks  about animal  dreams (and we suppose
that  primary  consciousness  does  accompany
their  very  elaborate  REM sleep),  no  one  be-
lieves that they are capable of verbally report-
ing their subjective experience. Dogs and cats
do, however, whimper, twitch, and run in their
sleep (Lucretius 1995), lending credence to the
hypothesis  of  primary  dream-consciousness  in
animals other than human beings. Animals may
dream,  and  they  may  become  lucid  in  their
dreams, but we doubt the latter and can never
offer scientific judgment about either possibility.
The  exploration  of  the  physiology  of
primary consciousness is in its infancy and can
be expected to flourish in the future even if we
have only  rats  for  subjects  (Datta &  Hobson
2000; Datta & MacLean 2007). But if we want
to  learn  more  about  secondary  consciousness,
we will have to put up with rather severe limit-
ations (Dresler et al. 2012). We trust that ad-
vances  in  brain  imaging  technology  may help
this  situation.  Meanwhile,  we  hold  that  the
study of lucid dreaming, however difficult, con-
veys insights about the brain basis of conscious-
ness that is obtainable in no other way.
4 Summary and outlook
What we have learned so far is that the occur-
rence of lucid dreaming seems to be facilitated
by brain  maturational  processes,  in  particular
the integration of the frontal lobes into the cor-
tico-cortical  and cortico-thalamic  networks,  as
outlined  in  thesis  no.  1.  Moreover,  in  lucid
dreaming arising out of REM sleep, the appar-
ent  spatial  dissociation  between two states  of
arousal, waking (rostral) and sleep (caudal) is
accompanied by the  phenomenological  dissoci-
ation expressed in an altered conscious aware-
ness, for example, by changing from a first-per-
son to a third-person perspective. This observa-
tion has led us to propose that lucid dreaming
is to be regarded as a hybrid state (thesis No.
2) within a state-space continuum (thesis  No.
3). Another observation concerns changes in fre-
quency-specific oscillatory activity, with signific-
ant increases in lower gamma band activity in
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lucid  dreams,  suggesting  that  lower  gamma
band activity plays an important role in achiev-
ing and/or maintaining a lucid dream. By elec-
trically stimulating the dreaming brain in this
frequency band we have been successful in try-
ing to elicit lucid dreams, suggesting a causal
role for the gamma frequency band, perhaps not
only in lucid dreaming but in higher-order con-
sciousness per se (thesis No. 4). 
In  spite  of  this  basic  scientific  progress,
our conclusions are only speculative and in need
of experimental testing. One future line of re-
search might be the spatial networking involved
in consciousness. In our research, we have only
stimulated  the  brain  through bilateral  fronto-
temporal  stimulation.  We  found  only  lower
gamma band activity to be successful in indu-
cing  lucid  dreaming.  What  happens,  however,
when we use different frequencies in rostral and
caudal areas? Another question in need of at-
tention is that of applicability. Will wake-train-
ing in gamma band activity through Neurofeed-
back  and/or  tACS  increase  the  rate  of  lucid
dreaming? What about effects on higher cognit-
ive functions? Finally, we hope that our findings
might some day be implemented in clinical set-
tings. This concerns, for example, comatose or
locked-in  patients  who  are,  through  their
trauma, confined to a particular state and who
may benefit from the possibility of maximally
utilizing state capacities. 
We have now reviewed and discussed the
current state of  the art with respect to lucid
dreaming.  Having  been  very skeptical  at  first
about whether such research could be conduc-
ted at all using a rigorous scientific protocol, we
have grown increasingly  optimistic—if  not  en-
thusiastic—about the prospects for the study of
lucid  dreaming,  allowing  us  to  monitor  the
brain as the mind changes conscious states. In
that spirit, lucid dream science may be likened
to a moon landing: yes it was hard to achieve,
but we did it, and returned to tell the tale. 
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